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Abstract: State level economy has always been relying on its major metropolitan 
area’s economic success. So, such metropolitan agglomerations have been 
considered the only agents that can foster the state’s economic standing as if other 
economic places do (or may) not have significant contribution to the regional 
economy. In contrast, as some major cities enhance their economic well-being and 
agglomerate in specialized sector, the rest of the region lose their economic 
grounds or stay constant by widening the economic gap among cities. Therefore, an 
institutional approach can help to establish new regional arrangements to 
substitute all economic places to coordinate each other and succeed the economic 
growth as part of state government by reducing the disparities. In this sense, this 
study builds upon the inquiry that seeks the impacts of some economic disparities 
among economic places (counties) on the performances of state level regional 
economy. 
Keywords: regional economic development, economic disparities, institutional 
approach 
JEL classification: H10, H11 
 
1. Introduction 
It is crucial to recognize how economic well-being of a state is identical to sharp disparities 
among cities within particular socio-economic indicators. The focus has always been that 
cities can enhance their economic standing by different set of arrangements. Public choice 
theorists consider that the autonomy of a jurisdiction within the present of coercive force 
of competition among different locality give rise to the economic prosperity of the 
jurisdictions. On the other hand, regionalist scholars conceive more of a comprehensive 
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entity which coordinates the regional economy and, by doing so, prospers the economy of 
particular region- mostly metropolitan area [Hooghe and Marks, 2003], because the 
spillover effect, coordination dilemma and spatial mismatches hidden the opportunity 
costs that the economic region has to bear [Barnes and Ledebur, 1992]. This empirical 
study intends to go through one step further of regionalist approach by posing the 
possible necessity of state level reforms that could foster the regional economic growth 
within political and structural coordination among different levels of economic regions. 
The hypothesis of this study is that economic disparity among cities leads to a relatively 
less economic well-being of state level arrangements. Barnes and Ledebur [1992], in their 
analysis, point out that city and suburb together share the destiny of metropolitan area’s 
economic standing in comparison to other metropolitan regions. In this manner, 
regionalist approach offers to deal with free-rider issues and to take advantage of 
economies of scale through relatively empowered comprehensive institutions [Savitch and 
Vogel, 2000]. Like other regionalists conceive that regional arrangements are not 
alternatives to the poly-centric set of jurisdictions but complements to existing institutions 
in which they have a chief role in prospering the sustainable economic growth of 
metropolitan areas [Hooghe and Marks, 2003]. This study has the same approach that 
state level regional reforms can enhance the economic standing within equal share among 
each jurisdiction by implementing critical programs for the same purpose. The space of 
agglomeration economies has always been thought as metropolitan area and this misleads 
to see the potential economic growth within the state level cooperation. 
2. Literature Review 
There are two main approaches about how government should be arranged in terms of 
contributing the economic growth of spatial arrangements by allocating the resources and 
designing the institutional structures. One approach is in favor of fiscal autonomy where 
the locality can compete with one another. It is also known as public choice perspective in 
which Tiebout [1956] offers multiple jurisdictions that their quasi-costumer residents can 
find their preferences of public goods. The basic assumption of this approach is that 
economic well-being can be obtained through the coercive force of competition among 
localities without overwhelming government interventions. On the other hand, the 
spillover effects, negative externalities, coordination dilemma and the lack of scale 
economy advantages lead some scholars to be skeptical about multiple jurisdiction based 
spatial arrangements. It is the regionalist approach that sets forth the set of public 
interventions designed to fulfill such tasks to relieve collective action problem by 
designating a comprehensive governmental entity [Savitch and Vogel, 2000]. These 
perspectives are directed to the failures of current situations which are called - market 
failure or institutional failure [Keating, 2004]. The efficiency and equity of resource 
allocation are the most socially desirable, and expected to be implemented otherwise the 
deviance from both purpose is mainly deemed as the market failure in the liberal politic 
economy. 
Regional studies have usually been focusing on the metropolitan areas as constitutes of 
central city and its surrounding suburbs. The place of analysis, therefore, was to solve the 
collective action problem in fragmented metropolitan regions by offering a regional 
government entity. This unilateral regional perspective is important to inquiry the 
metropolitan areas’ social problems. However, the regional approach should also see the 
state government as a political device, fiscal entity and coordinating structure in terms of 
    
 
 
247 
whether it can foster the regional economic growth within the similar theoretical 
perspective directed to the metropolitan studies. 
Michael Keating in his article “The Political Economy of Regionalism” clarifies how we 
should see the regionalist approach’s theoretical base; 
“The term region takes different forms in different places and refers to a variety of spatial 
levels. Spatially, it exist somewhere between the national and the local and is the scene of 
intervention by actors from all levels, national, local, regional and now 
supranational…even though, the theme of regionalism is increasing in importance, it is 
often weakly institutionalized itself ”. 
As such, the regionalist approach attracts many scholars in the need of economic well-
being of different level of spatial organizations. There are many arguments why 
interventionist arrangements are necessary and how it should form; 
Olberding [2002] states that proponents of regionalism have asserted a more optimal 
outcome is achieved when local governments recognize their interdependencies and act in 
a coordinated way…Some scholars have found that large economic differences among 
cities in a region demonstrate a need for a regional approach; however, others have 
concluded that large differences in local economies make it more difficult to pursue a 
regional strategy. 
David Rusk in his article “Growth Management: The Core Regional Issue” points out that 
growth management is rapidly emerging as the top regional issue of the next decade. 
There are two key targets: state legislatures, which control land-use rules, and federally 
required metropolitan planning, which shape the allocation of federal transportation 
grants… There are only twelve states that have enacted statewide growth management 
laws. They vary in effectiveness from strong (Oregon) to almost purely exhortatory 
(Georgia)…Maryland governor Parris Glendening’s Smart Growth Act strengthens a weak 
state planning law adopted in 1993…In some states existing regional planning 
organizations are likely to have their planning authority extended into housing policy, 
regional revenue sharing, and economic development policy. Some may also become 
vehicles for management of region-wide infrastructure programs formerly carried out by 
independent authorities. 
Miller et al. [2000] pose the importance of regional consensus; “The hyper-complex nature 
of US federalism requires multilevel intervention, using state and federal powers to 
reinforce local moves in the direction of regional co-operation and consolidation…Luther 
Halsey Gulick [1962], The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas, reflected the spirit of 
John Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’. Gulick’s one of the main points was that: all levels of US 
government—especially the states—must be brought to bear on emerging urban 
problems… Top-down directives, though out of favor, are necessary for managing 
metropolitan development and ensuring fiscal equalization. These are increasingly unlikely 
in Canada and a long shot in the US. Nonpublic groups, a potential regional force, lack 
unity and coherence. Voluntary consensus building is nice but not enough to shape 
regional patterns”. 
Keating [2004] criticizes that there could be an increase in inequality between regions and 
within those regions without a regional set of arrangements; 
“Regional anti-disparity policies emerged in the postwar era as an extension of Keynesian 
macro-management within the aim of rectifying what were seen as market failures in the 
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allocation of resources… The main instruments of diversionary policies were grants and 
incentives to private investors to locate in development regions; restrictions on 
investment in booming locations; the diversion of public sector investments into 
development regions; public infrastructure investment in advance of need, to create 
favorable conditions for growth…In many cases, regional policy was given inadequate 
administrative means, consisting of grants and incentives without the necessary 
coordination, monitoring and follow-up”. 
Olberding [2002] indicates the weakness of multiple jurisdictions by quoting that “public 
administration traditionalists assert that fewer local governments result in economy-of 
scale benefits, greater political accountability, more equitable treatment of citizens, and 
greater opportunity to address significant problems”. 
Hooghe and Marks [2003] points out that collective action problem arises among multiple 
jurisdictions since the free riding issue dominates the current view of governance 
structure. They offer how to deal with the coordination dilemma; “one strategy is to limit 
the number of autonomous actors who have to be coordinated by limiting the number of 
autonomous jurisdictions. The second is to limit interaction among actors by splicing 
competencies into functionally distinct units”. Likewise, Olberding [2002] states that 
“Scholars have long recognized the difficulty of achieving and sustaining voluntary 
cooperation among a large number of individuals with no central authority- the so-called 
“dilemma of collective action”. 
Other scholars have concluded that cooperative norms-or something conceptually similar-
are critical for shifting from competitive to cooperative behavior. For example, in her 
comprehensive review of the cooperation literature, Ostrom [1998] concludes that the key 
determinant of cooperation is "norms of reciprocity"-or the tendency of individuals "to 
react to the positive actions of others with positive responses and the negative actions of 
others with negative responses [Olberding, 2002]. 
3. Method and Data 
In order to evaluate the economic disparity among counties of the states (not including 
Alaska and Hawai), the units of analysis will be counties in each given state to find out the 
differences in terms of economic well-being. To deal with different factors that might 
affect the comparison analysis, it is crucial to classify them whether they are counted as 
MSA, micro statistical area or not in a metropolitan area by Census Bureau to control for 
urbanization and agglomeration effect. At the second step, the regional classification of 
the states will be important to rule out regional features such as historical or natural 
advantages. Furthermore, the number of counties can influence the diversity 
measurements since the large number of counties might result with a relatively big 
disparity and thus should be controlled. Another issue might be that some counties of a 
state can be located in a metropolitan area where its most part located in another state. 
Since the analysis compares the disparities among counties with state level economic 
performance, dropping such counties can result some important mismatches in the model 
equations where the values of state level economic indicators will overweight the 
variables of lacking counties in aggregate. Therefore, counties will be listed based on their 
state location. 
To answer the hypothesis, economic performance of state governments will be modeled 
as a function of the disparity of income level, education and employment rates among 
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their counties within other controlling factors. The model design will be used to compare 
relative importance of the state governments’ economy with the variation among their 
counties. For 48 states, the disparity value of each independent variable for given set of 
counties are expected to be predictors of the economic standing of state governments. 
Independent variables are the differences of median household income, education level 
(percentage of population with associate, bachelor’s, master’s, professional, doctorate 
degree), employment rates (percentage of population in labor force -16 years and over) 
for each state’s counties. Dependent variables are the rates of per capita income and the 
percentage of individuals above poverty level of state governments. 
To find out the disparity among counties, generalized inequality index will be used for our 
inquiry. Each value will be divided by the mean value then the average deviation will be 
inequality level for the use of determinant independent variables. For example, there is 
perfect income equality when everyone’s income equals the mean income but as the 
value deviates, the average of total deviation will be the inequality value for our set of 
independent variables. 
A multicollinearity problem might appear since the inequality levels are based on the 
variables that might be highly correlated each other. We can expect the income, education 
and employment to show the similar tendency then it might affect the diversity value for 
each state. The expected result may not be statistically significant in that the sample size 
for each model will be 48 and 41 respectively. However, we can obtain some identical 
partial coefficients when other factors are controlled.  
Model I:  per capita income (state) = β (disparities of median household income, education 
level, employment rates in counties) + Controlling factors 
Model II: the percentage of individuals above poverty level (state) = β (disparities of 
median household income, education level, employment rates in counties) + Controlling 
factors The data set is obtained from the US Census Bureau’s 2000 Summary Files of The 
Decennial Census 
4. Results 
The descriptive statistics show the range of disparities for each independent variable. 
From the general inequality index, each value indicates how it is deviating from the 
perfect equality which is 1. The widest disparity seems to be of education level for each 
model. The counties of Georgia, New Mexico, Tennessee and Virginia, which are located in 
MSA and MicroSA have the most inequality level of education among those of all states. 
On the other hand, the mean value of labor force disparity is relatively lower for both two 
models than other independent variables regardless of whether the counties are in MSA 
or not. Another noticeable finding is that the counties in Non-MSA and Non-MicroSA have 
lower range of disparity than the ones in MSA and MicroSA for independent variables 
except the labor force disparity. Finally, the states’ economic indicators- per capita income 
and percentage of individuals above poverty level- have the highest value in Connecticut 
and New Hampshire respectively, the lowest in Mississippi. 
In Table 2-4 (Appendix), the correlation values show that independent variables are 
positively related each other at 0.01 level. In other words, the inequality level of median 
income, education and labor force among counties have consistent tendency as it might 
be theorized. Besides, the dependent variables of the models- per capita income and 
percentage of individuals above poverty level- are also positively correlated (.704) at .01 
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significant levels. At the same time, it is important to look at the correlation values of the 
number of counties within the independent variables. In fact, the reason why the number 
of counties is included in each model as controlling factor is that it might affect the 
disparity level since the inequality level is measured by the average deviation from perfect 
equality 1. In the tables, it is shown that the number of counties is positively correlated 
with income disparity (.34), education disparity (.51) and labor force disparity (.33) level in 
MSA, MicroSA counties at .05, .01 and .05 level respectively. For the disparity levels of 
counties in nonMSA and MicroSA, the number of counties is significantly correlated just 
with the labor force disparity (.33) at .05 level. 
In Table 5, the states’ per capita income and percentage of individuals above poverty level 
are regressed on the median income disparity, education disparity, labor force disparity 
and number of counties in MSA and MicroSA. Two models explain .26 and .22 
(respectively) of the variation in the dependent variables at .001 and .01 levels. For all 
models, we expect the coefficients to be negative according to our hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the median income disparity among counties in MSA and MicroSA has a 
positive predictor on state’s per capita income. In other words, the state whose counties 
have more inequality in income level is better off in terms of per capita income. This might 
be because the median income can be skewed since multi-national, high wage offering 
firms agglomerate at specific advantageous locations which foster the state’s economic 
performance within a few economic places. On the other hand, education disparity has a 
deleterious impact on per capita income of a state at .05 level as the hypothesis expected. 
Finally, only significant partial coefficient is that of labor force disparity on state’s 
percentage of individuals above poverty level. As labor force disparity increase one unit, 
the model predicts the percentage of individuals above poverty to decrease .38 at 0.1 
significant levels. 
When we look at the disparities among counties in Non-MSA and Non MicroSa (Table 6), 
median income disparity loses its significance on per capita income which indicates that 
the disparity is much more identical in agglomeration (or urbanization) effect. Surprisingly, 
the education disparity has positive predictors in each model at .01 level. The state’s per 
capita income and percentage of individuals above poverty is expected to be better off 
where its nonMSA and nonMicroSA counties have more education inequality. One 
skeptical approach can be raised that the better off states can help their some Non-MSA 
counties’ educational attainment to a particular level while others stay constant. Finally, in 
Table 6, the labor force disparity seems to have negative impact on the percentage of 
individuals above poverty at .05 level.  
In last two tables, the range of predictors’ effect is seen based on the regions. The weight 
of income and education disparity among MSA, MicroSA counties is greater in the West 
and Midwest than South and Northeast. It is similar in the second model for education 
disparities’ positive impact of Non-MSA and Non MicroSA counties. On the other hand, in 
the Northeast and West, labor force disparity among Non-MSA and NonMicroSA counties 
has more deleterious effect on percentage of individuals above poverty level of the states. 
5. Policy Implications 
Case studies of regional partnerships for economic development have found that 
economic need is a key factor in the formation of regional partnership [Olberding, 2002]. 
In this manner, this empirical study seeks to answer how government organizations can 
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stimulate sustainable economic development in efficient way by also reducing the 
economic disparity. Specifically, it offers to establish state level regional arrangements to 
implement such tasks through its institutionalizing opportunities.  
As Hooghe and Marks [2003] implies, the regional approach may not necessarily mean 
that institutional arrangements are to be at the tradeoffs between public choice and 
regionalist perspectives. Some misspecifications might lead us to see narrowly the 
regionalist arguments as if they don’t provide us a ground to account for Tiebout’s model. 
Therefore, this study goes beyond the extreme theoretical arguments within the view of 
institutional necessity for the economic growth and equal distribution of the outcomes, 
even though the study seems to be built on regionalist perspective. In order to provide a 
better environment for economic growth, all possibilities should be taken into account 
through the mix of counter considerations 
The empirical results explicitly show us that economic disparities especially in labor force 
and education level in metropolitan areas are identical to the state’s economic 
performance in negative way. However, what makes difficult to accept the hypothesis is 
that education level and median income disparities surprisingly have positive coefficients 
in the models. Thus, a further inquiry is necessary to see what the fact behind it actually is. 
Nevertheless, it partly supports the argument that the concentration of economic well-
being at particular counties results with less successful economy at state level. 
Under the state governments, an economic development commission, in which the 
representatives of counties can cooperate for stimulating economic growth within the 
state by accounting not only specific successful places but within all counties, should be 
established and empowered through federal funds. The policy outcomes of such regional 
commission must not only focus on the current agenda but it is crucial to discuss other 
substantial improvements such as education, employment and infrastructure. 
6. Appendix 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
                                                                                    Min                  Max                   Mean                Std Dev. 
Per Capita Income                                                 15853              28766                  20712               2892.9 
 
Percentage of Individuals 
Above Poverty Level                                              .801                   .935                     .879                   .031 
 
Income Disparity Among 
Counties (MSA,MicroSA)                                       .095                  .350                     .180                   .056 
 
Education Disparity Among 
Counties (MSA, MicroSA)                                      .166                  .445                     .302                   .069  
 
Labor Force Disparity Among 
Counties (MSA, MicroSA)                                      .030                  .140                     .075                   .024 
 
Income Disparity Among 
Counties (Non-MSA, Non-MIcroSA)                    .063                  .236                     .128                   .037 
 
Education Disparity Among 
Counties  (Non-MSA, Non-MIcroSA)                   .114                  .393                      .205                  .063 
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Labor Force Disparity Among 
Counties  (Non-MSA, Non-MIcroSA)                    .040                 .161                      .084                  .029 
 
Number of Counties                                                   3                    254                        64.7                 46.4  
 
Table 2. Economic Disparities among Counties in MSAs and MicroSAs 
Dependent Variable                                           Per Capita Income                              Percentage of Ind ividuals 
Above Poverty Level 
Median Income Disparity                                        29307.4**                                                           .068 
                                                                                          (.573)                                                            (.122) 
Education Disparity                                                 -21021.8*                                                           -.129 
                                                                                        (-.504)                                                           (-.283) 
Labor Force Disparity                                                -6848.5                                                             -.387‡ 
                                                                                          (.057)                                                          (-.296) 
Number of Counties                                                         -8.9                                                              .000 
                                                                                        (-.143)                                                           (-.035) 
Constant                                                                     22883.4***                                                        .937***                                                                  
F                                                                                             3.877 ***                                               3.093** 
                                                                                            .265                                                         .223 
Adjusted                                                                            .197                                                         .151 
N                                                                                          48                                                            48 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (standardized); significant predictors in bold. 
‡ p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
Table 3. Economic Disparities among Counties in Non-MSAs and Non-MicroSAs 
Dependent Variable                                           Per Capita Income                              Percentage of Individuals 
Above Poverty Level 
Median Income Disparity                                        -12448.5                                                            -.054 
                                                                                          (-.194)                                                         (-.065) 
Education Disparity                                                   20213.1**                                                         .249** 
                                                                                           (.542)                                                          (.513) 
Labor Force Disparity                                               -13034.5                                                           -.545* 
                                                                                          (-.162)                                                         (-.520) 
Number of Counties                                                            3.992                                                        .000 
                                                                                          (.074)                                                            (.029) 
Constant                                                                      18332.4***                                                      .876***                                                                  
F                                                                                             2.225‡                                                    3.045* 
                                                                                            .198                                                         .253 
Adjusted                                                                            .109                                                         .170 
N                                                                                           41                                                            41 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (standardized); significant predictors in bold. 
‡ p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 4. Economic Disparities among Counties in MSAs and MicroSAs 
Dependent Variable                                                                               Per Capita Income                  
                                                                      Northeast                   Midwest                     South                      West              
Median Income Disparity                          24487.2*                   29388.6**              28988.4**         29810.2** 
                                                                         (.479)                          (.574)                      (.567)                   (.583)                         
Education Disparity                                  -18183.7*                  -20916.2*               -20642.0*          -21096.6* 
                                                                        (-.436)                         (-501)                      (-.495)                  (-.506) 
Labor Force Disparity                                  6909.3                       -6286.1                    -5806.2                  627.0 
                                                                         (.058)                          (-.052)                      (-.048)                  (.005)                 
Number of Counties                                         -4.5                              -9.4                          -8.6                       -14.3 
                                                                        (-.073)                         (-.151)                      (-.139)                   (-.231) 
Northeast                                                      1920.9  
                                                                         (.273) 
Midwest                                                                                               106.6 
                                                                                                              (.016) 
South                                                                                                                                     -150.5 
                                                                                                                                               (-.024) 
West                                                                                                                                                                 -1356.2 
                                                                                                                                                                            (-.199) 
Constant                                                     21168.0***              22800.1***           22778.8***        22911.2***         
F                                                                             3.793**                     3.033*                    3.035*              3.543** 
                                                                            .311                .           .265                         .265                  .297 
Adjusted                                                            .229                .           .178                         .178                  .213 
N                                                                          48                               48                             48                      48 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (standardized); significant predictors in bold. 
‡ p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
Table 5. Economic Disparities among Counties in Non-MSAs and Non-MicroSAs 
Dependent Variable                                                       Percentage of Individuals Above Poverty Level                 
                                                                      Northeast                   Midwest                     South                      West              
Median Income Disparity                             -.055                           -.078                        -.040                     - .062 
                                                                         (-.067)                        (-.094)                      (-.048)                   (-.075)                         
Education Disparity                                        .247**                        .325***                   .229**                  .274** 
                                                                         (.509)                          (.671)                       (.473)                   (.565) 
Labor Force Disparity                                    -.562*                        -.423*                      -.428‡                    -.532* 
                                                                         (-.537)                         (-.404)                     (-.409)                  (-.509)                 
Number of Counties                                       .000                            .000                          .000                       .000 
                                                                          (.016)                        (-.145)                       (.158)                   (-.034) 
Northeast                                                        -.007  
                                                                         (.-077) 
Midwest                                                                                               .040*** 
                                                                                                              (.593) 
South                                                                                                                                     -.028** 
                                                                                                                                               (-.440) 
West                                                                                                                                                                    -.009 
                                                                                                                                                                            (-.122) 
Constant                                                          .879***                     .850***                    .871***              .876***         
F                                                                      2.433‡                       8.304***                  4.842**              2.485‡ 
                                                                      .258                .          .543                         .409                      .262 
Adjusted                                                      .152                .          .477                         .324                      .157 
N                                                                    41                              41                             41                         41 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (standardized); significant predictors in bold. 
‡ p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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